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1 Introduction
The source of quantum computational ‘speedup’—the ability of a quantum
computer to achieve, for some problem domains,1 a dramatic reduction in
processing time over any known classical algorithm—is still a matter of de-
bate. On one popular view (the ‘quantum parallelism thesis’2), the speedup
is due to a quantum computer’s ability to simultaneously evaluate (using a
single circuit) a function for many different values of its input. Thus one
finds, in textbooks on quantum computation, pronouncements such as the
following:
[a] qubit can exist in a superposition of states, giving a quantum
computer a hidden realm where exponential computations are
possible ... This feature allows a quantum computer to do par-
allel computations using a single circuit—providing a dramatic
speedup in many cases (McMahon, 2008, p. 197).
Unlike classical parallelism, where multiple circuits each built to
compute f(x) are executed simultaneously, here a single f(x)
1An important example is the factoring problem (Shor, 1997).
2I am indebted to Duwell (2007) for this label.
circuit is employed to evaluate the function for multiple values of
x simultaneously, by exploiting the ability of a quantum computer
to be in superpositions of different states (Nielsen and Chuang,
2000, p. 31).
Among textbook writers, N. David Mermin is, perhaps, the most cautious
with respect to the significance of this ‘quantum parallelism’:
One cannot say that the result of the calculation is 2n evalua-
tions of f , though some practitioners of quantum computation
are rather careless about making such a claim. All one can say is
that those evaluations characterize the form of the state that de-
scribes the output of the computation. One knows what the state
is only if one already knows the numerical values of all those 2n
evaluations of f . Before drawing extravagant practical, or even
only metaphysical, conclusions from quantum parallelism, it is
essential to remember that when you have a collection of Qbits
in a definite but unknown state, there is no way to find out what
that state is (2007, p. 38).
Mermin’s reservations notwithstanding, the quantum parallelism thesis
is frequently associated with (and held to provide evidence for) the many
worlds explanation of quantum computation, which draws its inspiration
from the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics. According to the
many worlds explanation of quantum computing, when a quantum computer
effects a transition such as:
2n−1∑
x=0
|x〉|0〉 →
2n−1∑
x=0
|x〉|f(x)〉, (1)
it literally performs, simultaneously and in different physical worlds, local
function evaluations on all of the possible values of x.
The many worlds explanation of quantum computing is a very attractive
explanation of quantum speedup if one accepts the quantum parallelism the-
sis, for, since the many worlds explanation of quantum computing directly
answers the question of where this parallel processing occurs (i.e., in dis-
tinct physical universes) in a way in which other explanations do not, it is,
arguably, the most intuitive explanation of quantum speedup. Indeed, for
2
some, the many worlds explanation of quantum computing is the only pos-
sible explanation of quantum speedup. David Deutsch, for instance, writes:
“no single-universe theory can explain even the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen ex-
periment, let alone, say, quantum computation. That is because any process
(hidden variables, or whatever) that accounts for such phenomena ... contains
many autonomous streams of information, each of which describes something
resembling the universe as described by classical physics” (2010, p. 542).
Deutsch issues a challenge to those who would explain quantum speedup
without many worlds: “[t]o those who still cling to a single-universe world-
view, I issue this challenge: Explain how Shor’s algorithm works” (1997, p.
217).
Recently, the development of an alternative model of quantum compu-
tation—the cluster state model—has cast some doubt on these claims. The
standard network model (which I will also refer to as the ‘circuit’ model) and
the cluster state model are computationally equivalent in the sense that one
can be used to efficiently simulate the other; however, while an explanation
of the network model in terms of many worlds seems intuitive and plausible,
it has been pointed out by Steane (2003, pp. 474-475), among others, that
it is by no means natural to describe cluster state computation in this way.
While Steane is correct, I will argue that the problem that the cluster state
model presents to the many worlds explanation of quantum computation runs
deeper than this. I will argue that the many worlds explanation of quantum
computing is not only unnatural as an explanation of cluster state quantum
computing, but that it is, in fact, incompatible with it.3 I will show how this
incompatibility is brought to light through a consideration of the familiar
preferred basis problem, for a preferred basis with which to distinguish the
worlds inhabited by the cluster state neither emerges naturally as the result of
a dynamical process, nor can be chosen a priori in any principled way. In the
process I will provide a much needed exposition of cluster state computation
3My use of the word ‘incompatible’ might strike some readers as a touch strong. I do not
mean to convey by this any in-principle impossibility, however. Rather, I take it that any
worthwhile explanation of a process should provide some useful insight into its workings,
and should be motivated by the characteristics of the process, not by predilections for a
particular type of explanation on the part of the explainer. My claim here is that, as I will
show below, a many worlds explanation of cluster state quantum computing is completely
unmotivated and useless even as a heuristic device for describing cluster state quantum
computation, and is in this sense incompatible with it.
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to the philosophical community.4
In addition, I will argue that the many worlds explanation of quan-
tum computing is inadequate as an explanation of even the standard net-
work model of quantum computation. This is because, first, unlike its close
cousin, the neo-Everettian many worlds interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics,5 where the decoherence criterion is able to fulfil the role assigned to it,
of determining the preferred basis for world decomposition with respect to
macro experience,6 the corresponding criterion for world decomposition in
the context of quantum computing cannot fulfil this role except in an ad hoc
way. Second: alternative explanations of quantum computation exist which,
unlike the many worlds explanation, are compatible with both the network
and cluster state model.
The quantum parallelism thesis, and the many worlds explanation of
quantum computation that is so often associated with it, are undoubtedly
of great heuristic value for the purposes of algorithm analysis and design,
at least with regard to the network model. This is a fact which I should
not be misunderstood as disputing. What I am disputing is that we should
therefore be committed to the claim that these computational worlds are, in
fact, ontologically real, or that they are indispensable for any explanation of
quantum speedup.
My essay will proceed as follows. In order to exhibit the motivations
and intuitions for adopting a many worlds view of quantum computation,
I will begin, in section 2, with an example of a simple quantum algorithm.
4Apart from very high-level discussions such as those found in Steane (2003), no one,
to my knowledge, has yet presented, to the philosophical community, a detailed exposition
of cluster state quantum computing.
5One should be wary not to treat the ‘Everettian’ interpretation of quantum mechanics
as if it were a unified view. Rather, ‘Everettian’ more properly describes a family of
views (see Barrett 2011 for a list and discussion of these), which includes but is not
limited to Hugh Everett’s original formulation (Everett, 1957), ‘many minds’ variants
(Albert and Loewer, 1988), and ‘many worlds’ variants. Belonging to the last named class
are DeWitt’s (1973 [1971]) original formulation, as well as the, now mainstream, ‘neo-
Everettian’ interpretation with which we will be mostly concerned in this paper. I follow
Hewitt-Horsman (who attributes the name to Harvey Brown) in calling ‘neo-Everettian’
the amalgam of ideas of Zurek (2003 [1991]); Saunders (1995); Butterfield (2002); Vaidman
(2008), and especially Wallace (2002, 2003, 2010).
6I should not be interpreted here as giving an argument for the neo-Everettian in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics. My views on the correct interpretation of quantum
mechanics are irrelevant to this discussion. My claim is only that the decoherence basis is
prima facie well-suited for the role it plays in the neo-Everettian interpretation.
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In section 3, I will argue that, despite its intuitive appeal, the many worlds
view of quantum computation is not licensed by, and in fact is conceptually
inferior to, the neo-Everettian version of the many worlds interpretation of
quantum mechanics from which it receives its inspiration. In section 4, I
will describe the cluster state model of quantum computation and show how
the cluster state model and the many worlds explanation are incompatible.
In section 5 I will argue, based on the conclusions of sections 3 and 4, that
we should reject the many worlds explanation of quantum computation tout
court.
2 A Simple Quantum Algorithm
The motivation for the view that quantum computation is parallel process-
ing (i.e., the quantum parallelism thesis), is evident when one considers the
specification of certain existing quantum algorithms. Consider, for instance,
the following simple algorithm for solving Deutsch’s problem: the problem to
determine whether a boolean function taking one bit as input and producing
one bit as output is either constant or balanced.
Such a function is constant if it produces the same output value for each
of its inputs. If we consider the functions f : {0, 1} → {0, 1}, the only
possible constant functions are f(x) = 0 and f(x) = 1. A balanced function,
on the other hand, is one for which the output of one half of the inputs is the
opposite of the output of the other half. For the functions f : {0, 1} → {0, 1}
the only possible balanced functions are the identity and bit-flip functions,
which are, respectively:
f(x) =
{
0 if x = 0
1 if x = 1
f(x) =
{
1 if x = 0
0 if x = 1
Now classically, the only way to determine whether such a function is
balanced or constant is to test the function for each possible value of its input
(i.e., for 0 and 1). In this case, that amounts to two function invocations. In
a quantum computer, however, we can learn whether the function is balanced
or constant by evaluating the function only once.
To implement the quantum algorithm using the circuit model,7 we begin
7The exposition which follows is similar to Mermin’s (2007, p. 44). This is an improved
version of the algorithm originally developed by Deutsch (1985, pp. 111-112). Deutsch’s
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by preparing two qubits8 (initially assigned the state |0〉) in the following
way. First, we send them each through a NOT (i.e., a Pauli-X) gate, which
flips the state of the qubit. We then send them each through a Hadamard
gate, which transforms the state of each qubit into a coherent superposition
of the classical states, |0〉 and |1〉:9
(H⊗H)(X⊗X)(|0〉|0〉) = (H⊗H)(|1〉|1〉)
= 1
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)(|0〉 − |1〉)
= 1
2
(|0〉|0〉 − |1〉|0〉 − |0〉|1〉+ |1〉|1〉)
We now send the two qubits through a ‘black box’—a unitary gate, Uf ,
representative of the function whose character (of being either constant or
balanced) we wish to determine—which will perform the required evaluation.
We defineUf so that it leaves the first qubit alone but XORs the second qubit
with the result of evaluating f on the value of the first qubit, i.e.:
Uf(|x〉|y〉) =df |x〉|y ⊕ f(x)〉. (2)
Thus we have:
1
2
Uf (|0〉|0〉 − |1〉|0〉 − |0〉|1〉+ |1〉|1〉)
= 1
2
(|0〉|0⊕ f(0)〉 − |1〉|0⊕ f(1)〉 − |0〉|1⊕ f(0)〉+ |1〉|1⊕ f(1)〉) (3)
= 1
2
(|0〉|f(0)〉 − |1〉|f(1)〉 − |0〉|f˜(0)〉+ |1〉|f˜(1)〉,
where f˜(x) =df 1⊕ f(x). Note how the action of the unitary transformation
gives the appearance of evaluating the function over multiple inputs at once.
Now if the function is constant, then f(0) = f(1), f˜(0) = f˜(1), and the state
can be expressed as
1
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)(|f(0)〉 − |f˜(0)〉.
original algorithm, unlike the one given here, works probabilistically.
8A qubit is the basic unit of quantum information, analogous to a classical bit. It can
be physically realized by any two-level quantum mechanical system. Like a bit, it can be
“on”: |1〉 or “off”: |0〉, but unlike a bit it can also be in a superposition of these values.
9‘Logic gates’ in the network model of quantum computation are implemented as uni-
tary transformations. The Pauli-X transformation takes |0〉 to |1〉 and vice versa. A
Hadamard transformation takes |0〉 to |0〉+|1〉√
2
and |1〉 to |0〉−|1〉√
2
and vice-versa.
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If the function is balanced, f(0) 6= f(1), but f(1) = f˜(0) and f˜(1) = f(0),
thus the state can be expressed as:
1
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)(|f(0)〉 − |f˜(0)〉)
If we apply a Hadamard transformation to the first qubit then the state goes
to
|1〉 1√
2
(|f(0)〉 − |f˜(0)〉), |0〉 1√
2
(|f(0)〉 − |f˜(0)〉) (4)
for the constant and balanced scenarios, respectively. All that is left to do,
in order to determine whether the function is constant or balanced, is to
measure the first qubit in the {|0〉, |1〉} (i.e., the computational) basis.
The algorithm, taken at a glance, is:
(H⊗ I)Uf(H⊗H)(X⊗X)(|0〉|0〉). (5)
In this way, we solve the problem with only one invocation of Uf . It indeed
appears as though we have performed two steps in one.
3 Neo-Everett and Quantum Computing
Algorithms like Deutsch’s and more impressive algorithms like Shor’s (which
appear to perform many more than two steps in one) provide strong intuitive
support for the view that quantum speedup is due to a quantum computer’s
ability to simultaneously evaluate a function for different values of its input,
and from here it is not a large step to the many worlds picture of quantum
computation. It is important to note, however, that one’s conception of a
world, if one elects to take this step, cannot be the one that is licensed by
the neo-Everettian many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. In
superpositions such as the following,
1√
2
(|α〉 ⊗ |β〉+ |γ〉 ⊗ |δ〉),
the neo-Everettian interpretation will not, in general, license one to identify
each term of this superposition with a distinct world, for such a simplistic
procedure for world-identification will be vulnerable to the so-called preferred
basis objection.
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The problem is usually formulated in the context of macro-worlds and
macro-objects; however we can illustrate the basic idea by means of the
following simple example related to quantum computation. The classical
value ↑ can be represented, in the computational basis,10 by a qubit in the
state |0〉. We can also represent the same qubit from the point of view of the
{|+〉, |−〉} basis, however, as11
1√
2
(|+〉+ |−〉).
Thus depending on the basis one selects, it will be possible to regard the
qubit as either (if we select the computational basis) in the definite state
|0〉, existing in one world only, or (if we select the {|+〉, |−〉} basis), as in
a superposition of the two states, |+〉 and |−〉, and thus as existing in two
distinct worlds. Yet there seems to be no a priori reason why we should elect
to choose one basis over the other.
Neo-Everettians (see, for instance, Wallace 2002, 2003) attempt to elim-
inate the preferred basis problem by appealing to the dynamical process
of decoherence (Cf. Zurek 2003 [1991]) as a way of distinguishing different
worlds from one another in the wave function. Recall that Schro¨dinger’s wave
equation governs the evolution of a closed system. In nature, however, there
are no closed systems (aside from the entire universe); all systems interact, to
some extent, with their environment. When this happens, the terms in the
superposition of states representing the system decohere and branch off from
one another. From the point of view of an observer in a particular world,
this gives the appearance of wave-function collapse—of definiteness emerging
from indefiniteness—but unlike actual collapse (i.e., collapse as per von Neu-
mann’s projection postulate), decoherence is an approximate phenomenon;
thus some small amount of residual interference between worlds always re-
mains. But from the point of view of our experience of macroscopic objects,
this is, for all practical purposes, enough to give us the appearance of defi-
niteness within our own world and to distinguish, within the wave-function,
macroscopic worlds that evolve essentially independently and maintain their
10The computational, or classical, basis for a single qubit is the basis {|0〉, |1〉}, which
can be used to represent the classical bit states {↑, ↓}, where |0〉 = ( 10 ) , and |1〉 = ( 01 ) . An
alternative basis for computation is {|+〉, |−〉}, where |+〉 = 1√
2
( 11 ) , and |−〉 = 1√2
(
1
−1
)
.
11Since |+〉 = 1√
2
( 11 ) =
1√
2
(|0〉+|1〉) and |−〉 = 1√
2
(
1
−1
)
= 1√
2
(|0〉−|1〉), 1√
2
(|+〉+|−〉) =
1
2
(|0〉+ |1〉+ |0〉 − |1〉) = 1
2
· 2|0〉 = |0〉.
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identities over time. Thus, a ‘preferred’ basis with which one can define dif-
ferent worlds emerges naturally : “the basic idea is that dynamical processes
cause a preferred basis to emerge rather than having to be specified a priori”
(Wallace, 2003, p. 90).
On the neo-Everettian view, we identify patterns which are present in the
wave-function and which are more or less stable over time in this way with
macroscopic objects such as measurement pointers, cats, and experimenters.
But note that not every such pattern is granted ontological status; whether or
not we do so depends, not just on the process of decoherence, but also on the
theoretical usefulness of including that object in our ontology: “the existence
of a pattern as a real thing depends on the usefulness—in particular, the
explanatory power and predictive reliability—of theories which admit that
pattern in their ontology” (Wallace, 2003, p. 93). Thus, while decoherence
is a necessary condition for granting ontological status to a pattern, it is not
sufficient; we also require that doing so is theoretically useful and fruitful.
Returning to the quantum computer, it should be clear by now that
the neo-Everettian interpretation, as described above, cannot provide sup-
port for the view that quantum computers simultaneously evaluate functions
for different values of their input in different worlds, for as we have just
seen, decoherence determines the basis according to which we distinguish
one world from another on the neo-Everettian interpretation. The superpo-
sitions characteristic of quantum algorithms, however, are always coherent
superpositions. Indeed, the maximum length of a quantum computation is
directly related to the amount of time that the system remains coherent
(Nielsen and Chuang, 2000, p. 278). According to some, in fact, it is coher-
ence and not parallel processing which is the real source of quantum speedup
(Fortnow, 2003). Decoherence, in the context of quantum computation, ef-
fectively amounts to noise.
It appears, then, that we require a more general criterion for branching
than decoherence if we are to accommodate quantum computation to a many
worlds picture. Thus, Hewitt-Horsman (2009), who is notable among advo-
cates of the many worlds explanation for presenting a positive argument for
the many worlds explanation and not a mere assertion that other explana-
tions are impossible, rejects the idea that decoherence is the only possible
criterion for distinguishing worlds. Worlds, for Hewitt-Horsman, are (just as
in the neo-Everettian approach), defined as substructures within the wave-
function that ‘for all practical purposes’ are distinguishable and stable over
relevant time scales. With regards to macro experience these relevant time
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scales are long, and the point of using decoherence as an identifying crite-
rion for distinct worlds, according to Hewitt-Horsman, is that it is useful for
identifying stable macro-patterns over such long time scales. But the time
scales relevant to quantum computation are generally much shorter: “they
may, indeed, be de facto instantaneous. However, if they are useful then we
are entitled to use them” (Hewitt-Horsman, 2009, p. 876).
In such a situation we may, according to Hewitt-Horsman, consider coher-
ent superpositions as representing distinct worlds for the purposes of char-
acterising quantum computation. “Defining worlds within a coherent state
in this way is a simple extension of the FAPP[12] principle ... If our practi-
cal purposes allow us to deal with rapidly changing worlds-structures then
we may” (Hewitt-Horsman, 2009, p. 876). As for the preferred basis prob-
lem, it will not arise. Just as with the neo-Everettian interpretation, in the
quantum computer we have a criterion for selecting a basis with which to
decompose the wave function; in this case the basis is that in which the dif-
ferent evaluations of the function are made manifest, i.e., the computational
basis.
This fits in well with intuitions that are often expressed about the
nature of quantum computations ... There are frequently state-
ments to the effect that it looks like there are multiple copies of
classical computations happening within the quantum state. If
one classical state from a decomposition of the (quantum) input
state is chosen as an input, then the computation runs in a cer-
tain way. If the quantum input state is used then it looks as if all
the classical computations are somehow present in the quantum
one. ... the recognition of multiple worlds in a coherent states
[sic.] seems both to be a natural notion for a quantum informa-
tion theorist, and also a reasonable notion in any situation where
‘relevant’ time-scales are short (Hewitt-Horsman, 2009, p. 876).
Certainly it does look as if the computation is composed of many pro-
cesses executing in parallel, and plausibly it can be of some heuristic value
to think of these processes as taking place in many worlds. With this I do
not disagree. However, pace Hewitt-Horsman, I do not believe this is enough
to justify treating these worlds as ontologically real, for unlike the criterion
of decoherence with respect to macro experience, Hewitt-Horsman’s criterion
12FAPP stands for ‘for all practical purposes’.
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for distinguishing worlds in the context of quantum computation seems quite
ad hoc. Declaring that the preferred basis is the one in which the different
function evaluations are made manifest is like declaring that the preferred
basis with respect to macro experience is the one in which we can distin-
guish classical states from one another. But it is, in fact, a rejection of such
reasoning that leads to decoherence as a criterion for world-identification in
the first place. The decoherence basis, on the neo-Everettian view, is not
simply picked from among many possible bases as the one which serves to
capture our experience of definiteness at the macro-level. To do so would be
to commit the same sin (by neo-Everettian lights) that is committed by other
interpretations of quantum mechanics such as Bohmian mechanics or GRW
theory. This is the sin of adding extra elements to the formalism of quan-
tum theory in order to preserve classicality at the macroscopic level. For the
neo-Everettian, in contrast, decoherence is appealed to as a known physical
process that in fact gives rise to—and even then only approximately—the
appearance of distinct classical worlds (Cf. Wallace, 2010, pp. 55, 63-65).
The point of using decoherence as a criterion for distinguishing worlds is not
to save the appearance of classicality, but rather to explain why we experi-
ence the world classically, in this case13 by appealing to a physical process
that gives rise to our experience. The choice of the computational basis as
the basis within which different worlds are to be distinguished, however, ful-
fils no such explanatory role. It does not serve to explain the appearance of
parallel classical computation. It only declares, based on a particular priv-
eleged description of the computation, that parallel computation is occurring
in many worlds.14
An advocate of the many worlds explanation might make the following
rejoinder: the computational process, considered as a whole, is just as empir-
ically well-established as the decoherence process is (we know that a compu-
tation has taken place since we have the result). And just as the decoherence
13Note that I am not taking sides here in the debate over whether it is necessary to
appeal to causes in such explanations.
14I should mention that Wallace, who I am taking as representative of the neo-Everettian
interpretation of quantum mechanics, does seem to cautiously endorse a many worlds ex-
planation for some quantum algorithms: “There is no particular reason to assume that all
or even most interesting quantum algorithms operate by any sort of ‘quantum parallelism’
... But Shor’s algorithm, at least, does seem to operate in this way” (Wallace, 2010, p. 70,
n. 17). Wallace has also made similar remarks in informal correspondance. But whatever
Wallace’s views on quantum computation are, they are obviously separable from his views
on world decomposition for macro-phenomena.
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process gives rise to parallel autonomously evolving decoherent worlds which
are (approximately) diagonal in the decoherence basis, the computational
process gives rise to parallel autonomously evolving computational worlds
which are diagonal in the computational basis. Thus the computational pro-
cess gives rise to and therefore explains the computational worlds that make
up the computation just as well as the decoherence process explains the de-
coherent worlds that make up classical experience.
This response is problematic, however, for it is the computation itself,
in particular what distinguishes it from classical computation, that we are
seeking an explanation for. The many worlds explanation of quantum com-
putation promises to explain quantum computation in terms of many worlds,
but on this response it appears that we need to appeal to the computation
in order to explain these many worlds in the first place. This seems circular,
and even if the case can be made that it is not, the response fails to con-
sider that, as the Mermin quote with which I began this paper makes clear,
appearances can be misleading: we must be very cautious when describing
the quantum state characterising a computation. In particular, we must be
cautious when inferring from the form of the state that describes the com-
putation to the content of that state. For instance, as Steane (2003, p. 473)
has pointed out, according to the Gottesman-Knill theorem, an important
class of quantum gates—the so-called Clifford-group gates, which include the
Hadamard, Pauli, and CNOT gates—can be simulated in polynomial time
by a classical probabilistic computer (Nielsen and Chuang, 2000, p. 464).
This is interesting, since several quantum algorithms utilise gates exclusively
from this class. Thus the appearance of quantum parallelism in these cases
may be deceiving.
Even if true, the quantum parallelism thesis need not entail the exis-
tence of autonomous local parallel computational processes. Duwell (2007,
p. 1008), for instance, illustrates this by showing how the phase relations
between the terms in a system’s wave function are crucially important for an
evaluation of its computational efficiency. Phase relations between terms in
a system’s wave function, however, are global properties of the system. Thus
we cannot view the computation as consisting exclusively of local parallel
computations (within multiple worlds or not). But if we cannot do so, then
there is no sense in which quantum parallelism uniquely supports the many
worlds explanation over other explanations.
In any case, the questionable nature of the inference from the heuristic
value of the notion of computational worlds to the ascription of ontological
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reality to these worlds is one good reason to, at the very least, be suspicious
of the many worlds explanation of quantum computing. But let us, for
the sake of argument, grant the inference. Let us focus, instead, on the
antecedent clause of the conditional; i.e., on whether it really is true that
the many worlds description of quantum computation is the most useful one
available. In the next section I will examine the recently developed cluster
state model of quantum computation. I will argue that a description of the
cluster state model in terms of many worlds is, not only unnatural, but that
such a description is incompatible with the cluster state model. I will then
argue that this undermines the usefulness of the many worlds description of
quantum computation, not just in the cluster state model, but in general.
4 Cluster State Quantum Computing
On the cluster state model (Raussendorf and Briegel, 2002; Raussendorf et al.,
2003; Nielsen, 2005) of quantum computation, computation proceeds by way
of a series of single qubit measurements on a highly entangled multi-qubit
state known as the cluster state.15 The cluster-state quantum computer
(QCC) is a universal quantum computer; it can efficiently simulate any al-
gorithm developed within the network model. In fact it is computationally
equivalent to the network model in the sense that each model may be used to
simulate the operation of the other. Each qubit in the cluster has a reduced
density operator of 1
2
I, and thus individual qubit measurement outcomes are
completely random. It is nevertheless possible to process information on
the cluster state quantum computer due to the fact that strict correlations
exist between measurement outcomes. These correlations are progressively
destroyed as the computation runs its course.16
Since most readers are familiar with the network model, it will be easiest
to illustrate the operation of the QCC by exhibiting the way one goes about
simulating a network-based algorithm with the QCC. In the network model,
single-qubit gates can, in general, be thought of as rotations of the Bloch
sphere. For example, the Pauli X , Y , and Z gates can be thought of as
rotations of the Bloch sphere through pi radians about the x, y, and z axes,
respectively. Now, it is possible to simulate an arbitrary rotation of the
15For this reason the model has also been given the name ‘measurement based compu-
tation’.
16This gives rise to a third name for this model: ‘one-way computation’.
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Bloch sphere with the QCC by using a chain of 5 qubits as follows (Cf.
Raussendorf and Briegel 2002, pp. 446-447, Raussendorf et al. 2003, p. 5).
First, we consider the Euler representation of an arbitrary rotation.17 This
is
URot[ξ, η, ζ ] = Ux[ζ ]Uz[η]Ux[ξ], (6)
where the rotations about the x and z axes are given by
Ux[α] = exp
(
−iασx
2
)
, (7)
Uz[α] = exp
(
−iασz
2
)
. (8)
The first qubit in the chain is called the input qubit; it will contain the
state that we wish to rotate. It is thus prepared in the state |ψin〉, while the
other four qubits in the chain are prepared in the |+〉 state. After applying
an entanglement-generating unitary transformation to the qubits,18 the first
four qubits are measured one by one in the following way. We begin by
measuring qubit 1 in basis B1(0), where 0 is the measurement angle, φj , and
the basis is calculated as
Bj(φj) =
{ |0〉j + eiφj |1〉j√
2
,
|0〉j − eiφj |1〉j√
2
}
. (9)
The result of this measurement is denoted s1, where sj ∈ {0, 1} represents
the result of measuring the jth qubit.
We now use s1 to calculate the measurement basis for qubit 2, which is
B2(−ξ(−1)s1). Qubit 2 is then measured in this basis and the result recorded
in s2, which is then used to determine the measurement basis for qubit 3:
17The Euler representation is a way to represent the general rotation of a body in three
dimensions. The procedure to achieve such a general rotation consists of three steps:
a rotation of the body about one of its coordinate axes, followed by a rotation about
a coordinate axis different from the first, and then a rotation about a coordinate axis
different from the second. We represent rotations by Rotation operators, and matrix
multiplication is used to represent combinations of rotations. For example, a rotation of
α about zˆ followed by a rotation of β about yˆ followed by a rotation of γ about xˆ is
represented by Rx(γ)Ry(β)Rz(α). The analogue of the rotation operator in a complex
state space is the unitary operator.
18The procedure for generating entanglement is described in (Raussendorf et al., 2003,
pp. 3-4).
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B3(−η(−1)s2). We then use both s1 and s3 to determine the basis to use for
the measurement of qubit 4: B4(−ζ(−1)s1+s3). At the end of this process, the
output of the ‘gate’ is contained in qubit 5 (i.e., qubit 5 is in a state that is
equivalent to what would have resulted if we had applied an actual rotation
to |ψin〉), which we then read off in the computational basis.19
Similarly, it is possible to implement more specific 1-qubit rotations such
as the Hadamard, pi/2-phase, X ,Y , and Z gates. 2-qubit gates, such as the
CNOT gate, can be implemented using similar techniques (Raussendorf et al.,
2003, pp. 4-5) and we can combine all of these gates together in order to
simulate an arbitrary network.
To illustrate the general operation of the cluster state computer, imagine,
once again, that we are simulating a network-based quantum algorithm. In
each individual gate simulation there will be, on the one hand, those qubits
whose measurement depends on the outcomes of one or more previous mea-
surements for the determination of their basis, and on the other hand, those
that do not. We divide these qubits into disjoint subsets, Qt, of the cluster
C, as follows. All qubits, regardless of which gate they belong to, which do
not require a previous measurement for the determination of their basis are
added to the class Q0. We then add to Q1 all qubits which depend solely
on the results of measuring qubits in Q0 for the determination of their basis.
Q2 comprises, in turn, all qubits which depend on the results of measuring
qubits in Q0 ∪ Q1 for the determination of their basis. And so on until we
reach Qtmax .
We then begin by measuring the qubits in the set Q0. We use the out-
comes of these measurements to determine the measurement bases for the
qubits to be measured in Q1. Once these are measured, the outcomes of
Q0 and Q1 together are used to determine the measurement bases for Q2.
The process continues in this fashion until all the required qubits have been
measured (Raussendorf et al., 2003, p. 19). Note that the temporal or-
dering of measurements on the cluster state will, in general, not depend
on what role—input, output, etc.—qubits have with respect to the network
model. In fact, those qubits that play the role of gates’ ‘output registers’
will typically be among the first to be measured (Raussendorf et al., 2003,
p. 19). In general, the temporal ordering of measurements on a QCC that
19I have simplified this procedure slightly. The gate simulation actually realizes, not
exactly URot, but U
′
Rot[ξ, η, ζ] = UΣ,RotURot[ξ, η, ζ], where UΣ,Rot = σ
s2+s4
x σ
s1+s3
z is
called the random byproduct operator and is corrected for at the end of the computa-
tion (Raussendorf et al., 2003, p. 5).
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has been designed to simulate a network does not mirror the temporal or-
dering the gates would have had if they had been implemented as a network
(Raussendorf and Briegel, 2002, p. 444).
At this point we must ask ourselves whether it is possible to describe the
cluster state model using a many worlds ontology. At first glance there does
not seem to be anything barring such a description in principle. We might
view each of the qubits as existing simultaneously in multiple worlds, for
example, while the computation is being performed. But even if this were
possible, it is difficult to see what would be gained by such a description,
for this is neither a natural view of what is happening, nor a particularly
useful one: in the network model it seems natural to conceive of a unitary
gate as effecting a parallel computation by means of a transformation such
as that in equation (1). But such a ‘step’ is missing in the cluster state
model. There is nothing corresponding to such a unitary transformation. At
best we have a simulation of such a gate; however, it is a simulation that
bears no resemblance, in terms of its physical realisation, to the correspond-
ing network circuit. In addition, the temporal ordering of computation in
the cluster state has little, if anything, to do with the temporal ordering
present in the simulated network. Thus there is nothing corresponding to
simultaneous function evaluation in the cluster state, for on the cluster state
model gates are only conceptual entities that one may utilise for algorithm
design. When it comes to implementation, the logical division of the cluster
into distinct gates is completely irrelevant. Indeed, in order to characterise
the cluster state model it is not necessary to begin with the logical layout
of the network model at all, for the cluster state model is, arguably, more
effectively characterised by a graph than by a network (Raussendorf et al.,
2003, p. 20).
Far from being a natural and intuitive picture of cluster state computa-
tion, it seems, rather, that one must work against one’s intuition to view
the cluster state model as a model of parallel computation in many worlds,
and it is hard to see how such a description can be useful. Considerations
such as these prompt Steane to write: “[t]he evolution of the cluster state
computer is not readily or appropriately described as a set of exponentially
many computations going on at once. It is readily described as a sequence
of measurements whose outcomes exhibit correlations generated by entan-
glement” (2003, p. 474). Hewitt-Horsman, also, reluctantly rejects the
view that cluster state computation need involve an appeal to many worlds
(Hewitt-Horsman, 2009, pp. 896-897); however, as we have seen, she still de-
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fends the legitimacy and usefulness of describing network based computation
in terms of many worlds and of treating these worlds as ontologically real
(Hewitt-Horsman, 2009, pp. 890-896).
But the main problem, for one who wishes to defend a many worlds de-
scription of the operation of the cluster state computer, is not that such a
description is neither natural nor useful. The problem is deeper than this,
for it appears that it is for all practical purposes impossible to specify a
preferred basis in which to distinguish the worlds in which parallel compu-
tations take place in the context of the cluster state computer. Recall that,
in general, measurements in the cluster state model are adaptive: the basis
for each measurement will change throughout the computation and will dif-
fer from one qubit to the next. During each time step of the computation,
the (random) results of the measurements performed in that step will deter-
mine the measurement bases used to measure the qubits in subsequent steps.
But this random determination of measurement bases means that there is no
principled way to select a preferred basis a priori (and even if we did, few
qubits would actually be measured in that basis), and we certainly cannot
assert that there is any sense in which a preferred basis ‘emerges’ from this
process. Thus there is no way in which to characterise the cluster state com-
puter as performing its computations in many worlds, for there is no way, in
the context of the cluster state computer, to even define these worlds for the
purposes of describing the computation as a whole.
As a possible rejoinder, one might assert that the cluster state model
merely obscures the fact that the computation takes place in many worlds,
and that this would be revealed upon closer analysis by, for instance, consid-
ering how one might go about simulating a cluster-state computation with
circuits. In fact it is possible to simulate a cluster state using classically con-
trolled gates. Classically controlled gates are gates whose operation is depen-
dent on classical bit values (these are typically the results of measurements).
To avoid the problem of the continually changing basis, one might take the
additional step of deferring all measurements to the end of the process. Ac-
cording to the principle of deferred measurement (Nielsen and Chuang, 2000,
p. 186), this is always possible.
Such a simulation would require many more qubits and at least one more
two-qubit operation for each single qubit operation in the cluster, however.
In principle, there will be no bound to either the additional memory or to
the number of additional two-qubit gates required to realise the simulation
(de Beaudrap, 2009, p. 2). Practical methods, therefore, for simulating the
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cluster state with circuits allow measurement gates to be a part of the compu-
tational process (Childs et al., 2005; de Beaudrap, 2009). They decompose
the cluster state into a series of classically controlled change of basis gates
followed by measurement gates in the standard basis. Thus this will not solve
the problem for the many worlds theorist.
But perhaps some day an ingenious theorist will find a way to simulate
cluster state computation in some other model without the use of adaptive
measurements or classically controlled change of basis gates. What should
we say then? Even in this case I think it would be misleading to speak of the
cluster state model as obscuring the fact that many worlds are responsible
for the speedup it evinces. Recall that, for those who adhere to the many
worlds explanation of quantum computation, the motivation for describing
computation as literally happening in many worlds is that it is useful for
algorithm analysis and design to believe that these worlds are real. This
motivation is absent in the cluster state model irrespective of whether it can
be simulated in some other model. Moreover, irrespective of whether it can
be simulated in some other model, the cluster state model will, in virtue of its
unique characteristics, surely lead to new ways of thinking about quantum
computation that would not have occurred to a theorist working only with
the network model. To dogmatically hold on to the view that, in actuality,
many worlds are, at root, responsible for the speedup evinced in the cluster
state model will at best be useless, for, as we have seen, it will not help
our theorist to design algorithms for the cluster state. At worst it will be
positively detrimental if dogmatically holding on to this view prevents our
theorist from discovering the possibilities that are inherent in the cluster
state model.
5 The Legitimacy of the Many Worlds Ex-
planation for the Network Model
We saw, in section 3, that the many worlds explanation of quantum com-
puting cannot avail itself of many of the arguments in support of the many
worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics which appeal to decoherence as
a criterion for distinguishing worlds in order to circumvent the preferred ba-
sis objection. Further, we saw that while the decoherence basis is able to
fulfil the role assigned to it, in the many worlds interpretation of quantum
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mechanics, of determining the preferred basis for world decomposition with
respect to macro experience, the corresponding criterion for world decom-
position appealed to by those who defend the many worlds explanation of
quantum computing cannot fulfil this role except in an ad hoc way. Thus
we have one reason to reject many worlds as an explanation of the network
model of quantum computation. Let us put this consideration to one side.
We have just seen, in section 4, that the cluster state model of quantum
computation is incompatible with a many worlds explanation of it. In spite
of this, one might still wish to maintain the view that network-based compu-
tation, at least, is computation in many worlds. There is nothing wrong in
principle with such a stance. What makes this view problematic, however,
is the fact that the cluster-state model is computationally equivalent to the
network model. One must therefore be committed to the view that an al-
gorithm, when run on quantum circuits, performs its computation in many
worlds; while a simulation of the same algorithm, run on a cluster-state com-
puter, does not. Moreover, this is in spite of the fact that there may be
no difference in the way in which individual qubits are physically realised in
each computer.
As unfortunate as such a situation would be, it would be forced on us if
there were no other potential unifying explanations of the source of quantum
speedup available. Fortunately, however, there do exist potential explana-
tions for quantum speedup in the network model which, unlike the many
worlds explanation, are compatible with the cluster state model. For in-
stance, Steane’s choice, entanglement, is one candidate for the source of
quantum speedup that has been receiving much attention in the literature.
Entanglement has been exploited, in one way or another, in every quantum
algorithm developed thus far that has exhibited exponential speedup over
classical computation, and entanglement has been proven to be a necessary
condition for quantum speedup when using pure states (Jozsa and Linden,
2003).20 On this view, quantum computers are faster than classical comput-
ers because they perform fewer, not more, computations. By means of entan-
glement, quantum computers make it possible to manipulate the correlations
present between the logical elements of a computation without representing
20It has recently been shown, however, that one may achieve, using mixed states, a
modest speedup over classical computation even when there is no entanglement present,
and there are indications that it is possible to achieve exponential speedup in this way as
well. It still appears that quantum correlations of some kind are required for quantum
speedup, which some have named ‘quantum discord’. See Vedral 2010 for a discussion.
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these elements themselves (Steane, 2003, p. 477). Jeffrey Bub’s (2006; 2010)
view is somewhat similar. On this view, again, far from computing all of the
values of a function simultaneously, quantum computers are faster because
they avoid the calculation of any values of the function whatsoever, this
time by exploiting the difference between classical and quantum logic. On
Lance Fortnow’s abstract matrix formulation of the computational complex-
ity class associated with quantum computing, interference is identified as the
key difference between it and the corresponding complexity class for classi-
cal probabilistic computation.21 Fortnow develops an abstract mathematical
framework for representing these computational complexity classes. In Fort-
now’s framework, both classes of computation are represented by transition
matrices which determine the possible transitions between the configurations
of a nondeterministic Turing machine. This framework shows, according to
Fortnow, that the fundamental difference between quantum and classical
computation is interference: in the quantum case, matrix entries can be neg-
ative, signifying a quantum computer’s ability to realise good computational
paths with higher probability by having the bad computational paths cancel
each other out (Fortnow, 2003, p. 606).
Unlike the many worlds explanation, these explanations of the source of
quantum speedup do not rely on the particular characteristics of the network
model and seem straightforwardly compatible with cluster state computation.
But the fact that the many worlds explanation of quantum speedup is not
compatible with the cluster state model, while these other explanations of
quantum speedup are, is a reason to question its usefulness as a description
of network-based quantum computation, and thus one more reason to reject
it as an explanation of quantum speedup tout court.
6 Conclusion
I hope to have convinced the reader that, whatever the merits of the neo-
Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics are, the many worlds ex-
planation of quantum computing is inadequate as a description of either
the network or the cluster state model of quantum computation. We saw
above how it depends on a suspect extension of the methodology of the neo-
Everettian approach to quantum mechanics, and we saw how, unlike other
21These are: These are BPP (bounded-error probabilistic polynomial time) and BQP
(bounded error quantum polynomial time). Cf. Nielsen and Chuang (2000).
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explanations of quantum computing, it is unable to describe the cluster state
model of computation. I hope that the reader agrees that these are convinc-
ing reasons to reject the many worlds explanation of quantum computing.
I do not want to argue that the many worlds explanation of quantum
computation, particularly in regards to the network model, has no heuristic
value. It undoubtedly does, and thinking in this manner has assuredly led
to the development of some important quantum algorithms. Nevertheless
we should take talk of many computational worlds with a grain of salt. In-
deed, taking literally the many worlds view of quantum computation may be
positively detrimental if it prevents us from constructing models of quantum
computation, such as the cluster state model, in the future.
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